Ep&Meth (Notes). Theo Todman. Dancy – Contemporary Epistemology [email protected] 19/09/ Page 1 of CONTENTS. INTRODUCTION. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology has 69 ratings and 5 reviews. Richard said: This is a good overview of Contemporary Epistemology – but don’t th. This volume represents the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in theory of knowledge. Concentration on the central topics of .

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J. Dancy, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology – PhilPapers

Find it on Scholar. Published January 8th by Wiley-Blackwell first published January 15th These questions will be examined further in chaptersand doubt will be cast on the answer mooted here. The require- ment that the sensory support the non-sensory amounts to the view that justification is one-way, from sensory to non-sensory, and hence to the view that justification takes two forms, first the justifica- tion of the non-sensory by the sensory, and second the somehow different justification of the sensory.

Miklos Kurthy rated it liked it Mar 17, It seems that we cannot.

However, the theory does purport to offer a definition of truth. But then it would be difficult to find a reason for thinking that where the internal relation of justification is present, the external relation of truth is probably present too.

Kristian D’Amato rated it liked it Jun 11, The coherentist should be a monist here; he should claim that justification is jonathqn of the same sort. Founda- tionalists seem therefore to have to find yet a further form of justification for their principles of inference.

But it looks straightaway as if weak coherentism is in danger of being just another name for a form of foundationalism. So when we talk of the justification of a’s belief that p we are asking whether the proposition p forms, with other ot which a believes, a promisingly coherent contepmorary.


This article has no associated abstract. I would recommend this book if you already have had some introductory philosophy that includes some epistemology, and have sampled of some readings in philosophy that are not to difficult.

So a belief can be true without being justified and justified without being true, on the coherence account.

We might try to do so by distinguishing between two sorts of security that beliefs can have, antecedent and subsequent. But they episgemology not be; indeed it is always quite probable that dahcy expansion will require revision somewhere. After all, the coherentist must admit that the competing theories are all true since they are all equally coherentwhile the correspondence theorist can say that one is true and the others false.

And this is important because coherentists want to give a sense jonathaj the notion that as one’s belief-set grows, it improves we hope ; it becomes more coherent. It is a point against any system that it requires too substantial a rejection of the ‘data of perception’, whether or not the coherence of the system is thereby increased.

An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology

Offers the student a well-organized presentation of material relating to scepticism, to various philosophical accounts of knowledge and justification, to theories of perception, and more.

There is anyway an obvious intuitive link between entailment, as Blanshard sees it, and explanation. Only those people who hold no theory at all but view all theories from outside can give a sense to the notion of incompatibility between theories beyond that which the coheren- tist has already given.

Faheem Hussain rated it did not like it Jul 23, We do, for instance, suppose that you cannot be right when you say that this curtain looks orange to you, on the grounds that objects with the molecular structure of this curtain just don’t look orange.

For him it is an empirical question whether at the end of the day a more coherent system will result from the adoption of the empiricist ‘ attitude to sensory beliefs; whether this form of empiricist stubborn- ness will eventually pay off.


This objection, like so many other annihilating criticisms, would have more point if anyone had ever held the theory it demolishes.

Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology

A different approach is taken by Lehrerwhere he suggests that what needs to be explained is not the truth of p but rather the fact that a believes that p.

It is partly genetic; material comes from the sense-world, and without that world knowledge could not begin. The jonatahn does make this claim; he does offer a criterial account of truth, a theory about what are the criteria for truth.

intorduction For it appears to reintroduce a distinction between two sorts of justification. The sense in which, on the theory, truth is one thing and justification another does not detract from the advantage of having a smooth link between justification and truth. Bradley is willing to accept that the sense-world plays a special role in epistemology, but he is unwilling to accept that that special role emerges in the sort of asymmetry which characterises founda- tionalism ibid.

But we might be persuaded by the argument above to suppose that sensory beliefs do have an antecedent security that others lack. Want to Read saving…. Monthly downloads Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart. The removal of a sensory belief will create greater disturbance and require more to justify it, simply because the characteristic empiricist belief is part of the belief-set too.